We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-ridingproof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determine a contribution group, public good provision level, and its cost-sharing. The definition of the FRP-Core is based on credibility of coalitional deviations. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public good economy but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET) of a dynamic game with participation decision followed by a common agency game. We illustrate the properties of the FRP-Core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public good shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
Introduction
The free-riding problem is a central issue in collective decision-makings. Examples include lobbies that are formed to seek the government's protection. Firms in an industry may form a lobby to influence the government's trade policy, for example; but as long as sufficient number of firms participate in the lobbying (thus the protection level is reasonably high), some firms may want to stay out and free-ride on others. Free-riding incentives also exist in other collective decision makings, such as firms' cartel formation and international agreement to tackle the global climate change.
These problems can be regarded as pure public good provision problems with voluntary participation. Players have a choice between participating in a public good contribution group and free-riding on the contributors. If a player participates, she needs to share the cost of public good provision while she can influence on the level of provision. Otherwise, she does not need to pay any money while she has no voice on the level of public good provision.
There are specific features in this public good provision problem with voluntary participation. First, public good usage cannot be exclusive to the contribution-group members. This makes the free-rider problem severe in our problem. Second, expansion of the contribution group is always beneficial to everybody. The group expansion increases the level of (pure) public good provision, with all members sharing the incremental provision costs. However, a proposal of expanding the membership, which is regarded as a coalitional deviation, may not be immune to free-riding by the incumbents (more contributors, more free-riding incentives): thus some of these Pareto-improving proposals may be noncredible. To define an appropriate solution in the public good provision problem with voluntary participation, we must consider coalitional deviations in order to achieve more efficient allocations, while taking the credibility of deviations into account.
In this paper, we propose the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core) for the public good provision problem with voluntary participation, which is an institution-free hybrid solution concept (in cooperative and noncooperative games) with farsightedness. In this solution, a contribution group, public good provision level, and a payoff allocation within the group are all determined endogenously. The FRP-Core is defined in the following way. First, for each contribution group, we collect all allocations such that (i) they are immune to all coalitional deviations by subsets of the group to reorganize contribution group, and (ii) no member of the group is better off by unilaterally opting out of the group to free ride. These allocations constitute the set of internally stable allocations for the contribution group. 1 Second, for each contribution group, collect all internally stable allocations that are not blocked by any other contribution groups' deviations with their internally stable allocations. The free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core) is the union of such stable sets over all possible contribution groups. In the pure public good economy, the FRP-Core is always nonempty (Proposition 2).
The FRP-Core does not only have intuitive appeals, but has nice and useful correspondences with cooperative and noncooperative game solution (equilibrium) concepts.
First, our FRP-Core is equivalent to the core when the set of feasible allocations are restricted to the ones of free-riding-proof (Theorem 1). Thus, the FRP-Core has support from the cooperative game theory, which provide solutions that are robust to changes in detailed specification of the setup of discussed situations.
It also has support from the noncooperative game theory. We can characterize the FRPCore by constructing a detailed three-stage game of public good provision by introducing a passive player, the government. In the first stage, players decide if they join a contribution group. In the second stage, the participants of the contribution group individually offer their contribution schedules to the government. In the third stage, the government decides how much it provides the public good given the contribution schedules offered by the contribution group and the costs of public goods provision. The second and the third stage game is often called a common agency game (Bernheim and Whinston 1986 ). 2 Our equilibrium concept is stronger than simple subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; the set of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria of our second and third stage game is very large and contains many unreasonable equilibria. In order to refine the set of equilibria, we 1 For the credibility of coalitional deviations, see Ray (1989) . Also, see the discussion following Theorem 1 below. 2 Common agency game introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is widely used in political economy models with lobbying, especially in the field of international trade (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . employ perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE: Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) . 3 This solution concept has a few merits: (i) it allows players to propose a (coalitional) deviation plan in which they coordinate in their strategies through communications, (ii) the contribution group, public good provision level and its cost-sharing are all determined, and (iii) it assures that no credible deviation remains in equilibrium by requiring credibility of proposed deviation plans. 4 The third merit may require some clarifications. Suppose that a subset of players participate in the public good contribution. In public goods economies, it is always possible to improve efficiency in the Pareto manner by inviting nonparticipants to the contribution group. Once such invitations are made, however, some incumbents may have incentives to leave the contribution group since the public good provision level is increased by newcomers' participation, which raises the incumbents' deviation incentives. By adopting PCPNE as the equilibrium concept, we can focus on only credible deviations.
The main result of the current paper is the equivalence between the FRP-Core and the PCPNEs (Theorem 2). The proof of this theorem is demanding. In the proof, we use a characterization theorem of the set of CPNEs in common agency game with comonotonic preferences by Laussel and Le Breton (2001), 5 and heavily utilize the properties of the core in convex games (Shapley 1971) . We examine properties of the set of FRP-Core allocations with a simple example in which players differ only in their willingness-to-pay for a public good, and show that (i) there can be many different equilibrium contribution groups, (ii) an equilibrium contribution group may not include the player with the highest willingnessto-pay, and (iii) equilibrium contribution-group members may not be consecutive in their willingness-to-pay.
We also analyze how equilibrium public goods provision changes as the economy becomes 3 PCPNE is a natural dynamic extension of the celebrated communication-based equilibrium concept in simultaneous move games, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Whinston, 1986, and Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987) . 4 CPNE and PCPNE are strategy profiles that are immune to (recursively defined) credible group deviations with their strategies coordinated. A credible deviation is a deviation that is immune to further nested credible deviations. 5 Preferences are comonotonic if for all pair of players i and j, and all pair of actions a and a 0 , if i prefers a to a 0 , then j also prefers a to a 0 . Public good provision game satisfies this condition.
larger. Following Milleron's (1972) notion of replicating a public goods economy, 6 we prove that the equilibrium public good provision level converges to zero as the economy grows (Theorem 3).
This paper is organized as follows. The next two subsections briefly discuss some related literature. In Section 2, we set out our public goods provision game, and introduce the FRP-Core as a solution concept, and provide a simple characterization that will be useful in later sections (Theorem 1). In Section 3, we provide a noncooperative voluntary participation game, and propose PCPNE as an equilibrium concept. In Section 4, we prove the equivalence between PCPNE and the FRP-Core (Theorem 2). In Section 5, we provide an example to reveal some interesting properties of the FRP-Core. In Section 6, we consider a replica economy and show that the public goods provision level shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way (Theorem 3). Section 7 concludes. Appendix A provides useful properties of the core of convex games and an algorithm that finds a core allocation starting with an arbitrary utility vector. Appendix B collects proofs of our results.
Related Literature in Theory of Coalition Formation
Since the public good in our problem is pure so that outsiders can enjoy the benefits from public good provision, our problem belongs to the class of coalition formation problem with spillovers (externalities). The literature on this class of problems is very large (see Bloch 1997 and Ray 2007 for the overviews), and here we only mention papers that use similar solution concepts or the ones that deal with similar public good problems.
Recursively defined credibility in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium has been used in the theory of coalition formation. In cartel formation problem, Thoron (1998) shows that the largest "Nash-stable" cartel is CPNE when there is a single cartel in an industry. Yi and Shin (2000) prove the existence of CPNE and characterized it when multiple cartels can be formed. These papers assume that payoffs are not transferable among players, and that there are ex ante identical players. Transferable payoffs can be important in some contexts, since transfers affect players' incentives to participate or free-ride. For this reason, we allow heterogeneous players and transfers among coalition members, 7 and adopt PCPNE instead of CPNE as a solution concept. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to use PCPNE as the solution concept of coalition formation problem, which endogenously determines the formation of coalition and the allocation of payoffs within the coalition.
There is also the literature of coalition formation problem of public good provision.
Assuming identical players and nontransferable payoffs, Bloch (1997) provides a complete comparison of the equilibrium coalition structures by employing various solution concepts and game forms. Assuming identical players, Ray and Vohra (2001) characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and payoff allocations by employing a standard sequential coalitional bargaining game. 8 Although these authors allow multiple coalitions to form for public goods provision, we assume that there is only one coalition to form and its members are the only ones who can provide public goods. 9 However, we allow heterogeneous players, and provide a simple characterization of PCPNEs by using the equivalence with the FRP-Core.
Related Literature on Voluntary Participation Mechanisms in Public Goods Economy
It is well known that the public goods provision is subject to free-riding incentives. Although Samuelson's (1954) view of this problem was pessimistic, Groves and Ledyard (1977) show that efficient public goods provision can be achieved in Nash equilibrium. Although the Groves-Ledyard mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality, Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) show that the Lindahl mechanism is implementable. Subsequently, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to improve the properties of mechanisms. They all assume, 7 Actually, with heterogeneous players, there is no single natural way to share the cost of public good provision. 8 More generally, Ray and Vohra (1999) analyze the coalition bargaining game in the class of partition function form transferable utility games with heterogenous players (see Ray 2007) . 9 With our third stage common agency game, this difference turns out to be unimportant (c.f. Ray and Vohra, 2001 ). Even if multiple coalitions are formed, equilibrium public good provision level will be the same as the case of the union of them is the contribution group. However, we need to assume that non-participants cannot contribute in the third stage.
however, that players have no freedom to make participation decisions about the mechanism, i.e., players' participation to the mechanism is always assumed.
Introducing outside opportunities by a "reversion function" (each outcome is mapped to another outcome in the case of no participation), Jackson and Palfrey (2001) analyze the implementation problem when players' participation in a mechanism is voluntary. They extend the Maskin monotonicity condition to accommodate voluntary participation problem.
Although their reversion function is very general, it assigns the same outcome no matter who deviates from the original outcome. Thus, the method may not be suitable for a public goods provision problem in which different players' deviations from participation may generate different outcomes. Taking this consideration into account, Healy (2007) analyzes the implementation problem in a public goods economy demanding all players' participation in equilibrium (equilibrium participation). He shows that as the economy is replicated in Milleron's sense (1972), the set of outcomes of any mechanism that satisfies the equilibrium participation condition converges to the endowment. Although we also show in our model that the equilibrium public goods provision level converges to zero as the economy is replicated, we allow some players not to participate in the contribution group in equilibrium (and efficiency of public good provision within the lobby group is achieved, unlike in Healy, 2007).
Thus, Healy's and our results are quite different from each other.
Closest to our noncooperative framework is the one by Saijo and Yamato (1999) , who are the first to consider a voluntary participation game with two stages in a public goods economy, without requiring all players' participation in equilibrium. 10 They show a negative result on efficiency of public goods provision, and then characterize subgame perfect equilibria in a symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility case. In contrast, we show the set of PCPNE of a common agency game with a participation decision is equivalent to our FRP-Core by allowing heterogeneous players that have quasi-linear utility functions. 10 In the field of international trade, Bombardini (2008) and Paltseva (2006) extend Grossman and Helpman's (1994) menu-auction political-economy model to incorporate firms' voluntary participation in lobbies: they consider the cases in which firms in oligopolistic, import-competing industries make participation decisions. Unlike our noncooperative game framework, Bombardini (2008) assumes that the most efficient group is formed, while Paltseva (2006) assumes that firms are symmetric and derives subgame perfect equilibrium as opposed to PCPNE. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show that in a binary public goods provision game where symmetric players voluntarily make participation decisions, all pure strategy Nash equilibria are efficient (if contributions are not refundable in case of no provision). With asymmetric players, there are many Nash equilibria with different levels of cooperation. Shinohara (2007) examines a public goods provision problem with decreasing marginal benefits, and shows in the case of homogeneous players that it becomes harder to support efficient allocations as the efficient level of the public good rises and hence the number of participants needed to provide the public good increases. Our Theorem 2 has some similarity to this result.
The Model
This section sets out the contribution game in which all players' interests are in the same direction, while the intensity of their interests can be heterogeneous. We first describe the problem, then propose the FRP-Core as a hybrid solution concept.
Public Goods Provision Problem
A stylized public goods model is defined as follows. There is a public good whose provision level is denoted by a ∈ A = R + . 11 Provision cost function C : A → R + is continuous and strictly increasing with C(0) = 0. The government provides the public good, and its cost is regarded as the government's disutility from the provision. That is, the government's utility from providing a units of the public good is v G (a) = −C(a). Player i's utility function is quasi-linear such that the net consumption x of the private goods enter the function linearly,
i.e., v i (a) − x, where v i : A → R + is a strictly increasing function with v i (0) = 0. In order to guarantee the existence of a non-trivial solution, we assume that (i) there existsã ∈ A such
where N is the set of players, and (ii) there isâ ∈ A such that P i∈N v i (a) − C(a) < 0 for all a >â. The only new element to this standard public goods provision game is that every player has a choice between participating in contributing to the public goods provision and free-riding.
Free-Riding-Proof Core
Now, we characterize PCPNE. To do so, we first define an intuitive hybrid solution concept, free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which is the set of the Foley-core allocations that are immune to free-riding incentives and are Pareto-optimal in a constrained sense. 12 The FRPCore is always nonempty in the public good provision problem.
The public good provision problem determines two things: (i) which group provides public goods and how much, and (ii) how to allocate the benefits from the public good among the members of the group (or how to share the cost). For S ⊆ N with S 6 = ∅, let
, and u j = v j (a) for all j / ∈ S (utility allocation). An efficient allocation for S is an allocation (S, a, u) such that P i∈S u i = V (S) with a = a * (S). Note that N\S are passive free-riders, and they do not contribute at all. Let X(S) be the collection of all efficient allocations for S. A freeriding-proof efficient allocation for S is an efficient allocation for S, (S, a * (S), u) ∈ X(S) such that
Let X F RP (S) be the set of all free-riding-proof efficient allocations for S. Note that X F RP (S)
can be empty when S is a large set: with a large number of members, it becomes harder to satisfy free-riding-proofness.
Given that S is the contribution group, a natural way to allocate utility among the members is to use the core (Foley 1970) . Focusing on coalition S and its subsets, let
, the set of all core allocations for S, which is immune to all subcoalitions' group deviations. Obviously, a core allocation for S may not be immune to free-riding incentives by the members of S. Let
. An FRP-Core allocation for S is a core allocation for S that is immune to unilateral deviations via free-riding. Note that, given the nature of the public goods provision problem, we can allow multiple players in S free-riding together at no cost (since one-person free-riding is the most profitable: deviators are worse-off by free-riding together). Let Core F RP (S) be the set of all FRP-Core allocations for S. This is a collection of internally stable allocations for S in the sense that no subgroup of S have incentive to deviate, and no one player in S has no incentive to go free-riding. As
may be empty for a large group S, whereas for small groups it is nonempty (especially, for singleton groups it is always nonempty). Now, we consider "fully" stable allocations by considering about blockings by nonnested
, and (iii) 13 Our main solution concept free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core) is a collection of all FRP-Core allocations for all S, which are not blocked by any coalitions T via an FRP-Core allocation for T . That is,
there is no T and (T, a
Thus, FRP-Core is a collection of internally stable allocations for some coalition that are not blocked by any other internally stable allocations for any other coalitions. Thus, we impose a credibility constraint for legitimacy of coalitional deviations, by regarding non-internally stable coalitional deviations non-credible as there would be further deviations from such deviations.
The above hybrid solution concept is nice and natural, but it might be hard to work on. 13 We use "weak" blocking and weak Pareto-domination in this paper, partly because it would give us clearer result in the noncooperative game we consider.
For example, it is not immediately clear if FRP-Core is nonempty or not. The following proposition provides a useful property of the core for subsets of N.
Proposition 1 shows that if a core allocation for T is preferred to a core allocation for
S by all members of T , then the former allocation Pareto-dominates the latter in our pure public good economy. This makes the properties of FRP-Core easy to analyze by rewriting it:
where • denotes the Pareto frontier of • : i.e., for a set of allocations K, an allocation
This property assures nonemptiness of Core F RP .
We can characterize Core F RP by using the standard core concept on a restricted allocation set. Take the union of all free-riding-proof efficient allocations for S over all S ⊆ N:
Let us apply the core concept when the feasible set is the set of free-riding-proof allocations X F RP :
We have the following theorem.
A few remarks to follow. First, for the standard TU and NTU characteristic function form game, Ray (1989) defined the credible core by defining credible coalitions recursively on nested coalitions, and showed that the core and the credible core are equivalent. His argument extends to our case as Theorem 1 tells us, although our game has externalities due to spillovers of public good and the grand coalition usually does not support the FRP-Core.
Second, note that we imposed efficiency on the allocations in the definition of X F RP only for simplicity. We can easily allow inefficient allocations in the definition of feasible allocations as well by usingX F RP (S) = {(S, a, u) :
for all i ∈ S}, and lettingX
What we cannot allow easily is to assign arbitrary public good provision levels for contribution groups S (i.e., a(S) 6 = a * (S)). We need to consider public good provision levels explicitly in order to define free-riding-proof allocations: we need to specify a(S\{i}) for each i ∈ S. We may say that efficient public good provision level a * (S) is a natural candidate to be assigned to each group S.
A Voluntary Participation Game
We discuss the endogenous contribution-group formation and its consequences on the public good provision. To this end, we do not only require the menu auction stage of public good provision to be coalition-proof, but require the contribution-group formation itself to be coalition-proof. To do so, we first need to define the first-stage group-formation game in an appropriate manner, assuming that the outcome of each possible group S is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of a common agency game played by S. As an extension of CPNE in the strategic form games to the one in the extensive form games, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) define the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for multi-stage games.
The first-stage group-formation game is such that each player i ∈ N chooses her action from the set Σ 1 i = {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 represent non-participation and participation, respectively, i.e., player i announces her participation decision. Once action profile
j is selected, then the contribution game takes place in the second stage with the set of active players S(σ 1 ) = {i ∈ N :
14 Since the agent's (the 14 In our model, there will be a single coalition lobbying for (or contributing to) the public goods provision. In contrast, Ray and Vohra (2001) analyze a dynamic coalition bargaining of a public goods provision government's) choice in the third stage is mechanical decision problem, we will incorporate this stage in the second stage lobbying game (as is done in Bernheim and Whinston, 1986 ).
The second-stage game is a menu auction game (or a common agency game) played by participating principals S(σ 1 ) (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). The set N \S(σ 1 ) is the set of passive free-riders. Each player i ∈ S(σ 1 ) simultaneously offers a contribution schedule
Given the profile of contribution schedules τ S(σ 1 ) , the government G (the agent) chooses a public goods provision level a ∈ A that maximizes its net payoff:
where the first term on the right-hand side of the last equation is the total contribution and the second term is the cost of public goods provision. If the government chooses a ∈ A, then player i obtains her payoff
for i ∈ S(σ 1 ), and
. The government's optimal choice is described by
In this game, the government is not a player; it is just an automaton that maximizes its payoff given the contribution schedules. 15 Let T be the set of all contribution plans τ : A → R + .
Player i's second stage strategy σ problem with multiple resulting coalitions. For detailed surveys on coalition formation problems with multiple coalitions (and externalities), see Bloch (1997) and Ray (2007) . We do not allow multiple lobbying groups to be faced with multiple agents (such as local governments). See footnote 11. 15 Strictly speaking, since the government may have multiple optimal policies, we need to introduce a tiebreaking rule. However, it is easy to show that the set of truthful equilibria (see below) would not depend on the choice of tie-breaking rules.
Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium in the ContributionGroup Participation Game
Now, we define PCPNE for our two-stage game, following Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
i denotes i's lobby participation choice, and σ
which is given in the contribution game when contribution group S is determined by S(σ 1 ).
For T ⊆ N, we consider a reduced game Γ(T, σ −T ) in which only players in T are active while players in N \ T are passive such that they always choose σ −T . We also consider proper subgames for every σ 1 ∈ Σ 1 , and reduced subgames Γ(T,
and an agenda a * chosen by the agent is PCPNE if σ 2 * i maximizes u i through the choice of a * .
(b) Let (n, t) be the pair of the number of players and the number of stages of the reduced (sub-) game, where t ∈ {1, 2}. Let (n, t) 6 = (1, 1). Assume that PCPNE has been defined for all games with m players and r stages, where (m, r) ≤ (n, t) with (m, r) 6 = (n, t).
(i) For any game Γ with n players and t stages, (σ * , a
, and if the restriction of s * to any proper subgame forms a (P)CPNE in that subgame, and 16 For notational simplicity, we include outsiders' second-stage strategies in the strategy profile. Of course, such a non-participant's second-stage strategies are absolutely irrelevant to the outcome since the government does not receive contributions from them. 17 Note that in Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), the definition of PCPNE is based on strictly improving coalitional deviations. However, we adopt a definition based on weakly improving coalitional deviations, since the theorem on menu auction in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) uses CPNE based on weakly improving deviation. For details on these two definitions, see Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
(ii) for any game Γ with n players and t stages, (σ * , a * ) is a PCPNE if it is perfectly self-enforcing, and if there does not exist another perfectly self-enforcing pair
.., n with at least one strict inequality.
For any T ⊆ N and any strategy profile σ, let P CP NE(Γ(T, σ −T )) denote the set of PCPNE strategy profiles for T in the game Γ(T, σ −T ). For any strategy profile (σ, a), a strate-
A PCPNE is a strategy profile that is immune to any credible coalitional deviation. An
and (u, u G ) is the resulting utility allocation for players.
There are two remarks to be made on PCPNE.
First, if a coalition T wants to deviate in the first stage within the reduced game Γ(T, σ −T ) (thus keeping the outsiders' strategy profile fixed), it can orchestrate the whole plan of the deviation by assigning a new CPNE to each subgame so that the target allocation (by the deviation) would be attained as PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(T, σ −T ).
Second, the definition of PCPNE coincides with the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) in the (static) second stage. Thus, a CPNE needs to be assigned to each subgame.
There are useful characterizations of CPNE of a menu auction (common agency) game in the literature. Consider subgame S. Let us denote player i's strategy in this subgame
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) introduce a concept of truthful strategies, where τ i is truthful relative toā if and only if for all a ∈ A either
is a Nash equilibrium such that τ * i is truthful relative to a * ∈ A for all i ∈ S. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that (i) every truthful equilibrium is a CPNE, and (ii) the set of truthful equilibria and that of CPNE in the utility space are equivalent, and provide a nice characterization of CPNE in the utility space. 
The Main Result
Now, we will characterize PCPNE by the FRP-Core. In the public goods provision problem, the above Fact (Laussel and Le Breton 2001) implies that the second-stage CPNE outcomes coincide with the set of all core allocations of a characteristic function form game for S with 19 This is nothing but Foley's core in a public goods economy for S (Foley, 1970) . This observation gives us some insight in our two-stage noncooperative game. First, for each subgame characterized by S 0 = S(σ 10 ), the utility outcome u S 0 must be in the core of (V (T )) T ⊆S 0 . Second, given the setup of our groupformation game in the first stage, if a CPNE outcome u in a subgame S can be realized as the equilibrium outcome (on-equilibrium path), it is necessary that u ∈ Core F RP (S), since otherwise some member of S would deviate in the first stage obtaining a secured free-riding payoff. This observation is useful in our analysis of the equivalence theorem. With some constructions, we can show the following:
If an allocation (S, a * (S), u) is in the FRP-Core, then there is a PCPNE σ whose outcome is (S, a * (S), u). 18 In the public goods provision problem, u G = −C(0) = 0, thusṼ (T ) = V (T ) for all T ⊆ S. A payoff vector u S = (u i ) i∈S is in the core if and only if P i∈S u i = V (S), and 19 Indeed, CPNE and strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959 ) with weakly improving deviations are equivalent in a menu auction (common agency) game with no-rent property. See Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
Although the proof of Proposition 3 to the Appendix B (with some preliminary analyses in the Appendix A), we briefly describe how to construct PCPNE σ. First, in defining σ, we need to assign a CPNE utility profile to every subgame that corresponds to a coalition S ⊆ N. Since the second-stage strategy profile is described by utility allocations assigned to each subgame, we partition the set of subgames S = {S ∈ 2 N : S 6 = ∅} into three categories:
(i) S 1 = {S * } on the equilibrium path, which is the contribution group formed in equilibrium,
(ii) S 2 = {S ∈ S : S ∩ S * = ∅}, and (iii) S 3 = {S ∈ S\S 1 : S ∩ S * 6 = ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S 0 corresponds to a core allocation for S 0 . To support the equilibrium path (S * , a * (S * ), u * ) ∈ Core F RP by a PCPNE, we need to show that there is no credible deviation in the first stage. This requires careful assignments of core allocations to all subgames.
We prove Proposition 3 by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that there is a credible deviation T from S * , which leads to the formation of lobby S 0 after the deviation. Then, for all members of T , both profitability of deviation and free-riding-proofness must be satisfied. Thus, for every player i ∈ T , the post deviation payoff u
The case where S 0 ∩ S * 6 = ∅ is most subtle. We show that even in such cases, if there were such a deviation, there would exist an allocation
. By the characterization in Proposition 2, this contradicts the assumption that (S * , a * (S * ), u * ) ∈ Core F RP . We show Pareto-domination by using the fact that the utility allocation assigned to subgame S 0 under σ is a core allocation, and construct a core allocation by the algorithm that is provided in Appendix A.
Once this direction of the relationship between the FRP-Core and PCPNE is established, the converse is trivial. The PCPNE requires free-riding-proofness. Thus, every PCPNE must be a FRP-Core allocation for some S. Since Core F RP is the Pareto-frontier of ∪ S⊆N Core F RP (S), Proposition 3 indeed implies that any Pareto-dominated FRP-Core allocation for S can be defeated by a FRP-Core allocation, which is supported by PCPNE. Proof. We prove the converse of the relationship described in Proposition 3, i.e., we show that every PCPNE σ generates a FRP-Core allocation as its outcome. It is easy to see that the outcome (S, a * (S), u) of a PCPNE σ is a FRP-Core allocation (and not just core allocation) for S, since otherwise a player would have an incentive to free-ride in the first stage of the extension game and hence the resulting allocation will not be a subgame perfect Nash
there is a FRP-Core allocation (S 0 , a 
An Example: Linear Utility and Quadratic Cost
Let v i (a) = θ i a for any i ∈ N and C(a) = a 2 /2, where θ i > 0 is a preference parameter.
Here in this section, we identify players by their preference parameters, i.e., θ i = i for any i ∈ N. Then, the optimal level of the public good for group S is determined by the first-order
Consequently, the value of S is written as
For an outsider j ∈ N\S, the payoff is
Consider the following example. The sum of all these values exceeds the value of the grand coalition V (N). As a result, we can conclude Core F RP (N) = ∅.
• The FRP-Core for the grand coalition N may be empty. Thus, the FRP-Core may be suboptimal.
Next, consider S = {11, 5}. Then, a * (S) = 16, and V (S) = 128. In order to check if the FRP-Core for S is nonempty, we first check again the free-riding incentives. It is readily seen that Core F RP ({11, 5}) 6 = ∅, but it is a smaller set than Core({11, 5}).
• Free-riding-proof constraints may narrow the set of attainable core allocations for a coalition.
Note that in this case, only the free-riding incentive constraint for player 5 is binding. It is better for player 11 to provide public goods alone than free-riding on player 5. immunity to coalitional deviation attempts and to free-riding incentives. However, it is easy to narrow down the candidates by using a necessary condition for the nonemptiness of the FRP-Core for S.
Observation. In the case of linear utility and quadratic cost, if the FRP-Core for S is nonempty, then S satisfies the following aggregate "no free-riding condition."
The proof is straightforward and hence omitted. By utilizing this proposition, we can characterize the FRP-Core of the public goods economy in Example 1.
Example 1. (continued)
The FRP-Core allocations are attained by groups {11, 5, 1}, {11, 3, 1}, {11, 5}, {11, 3}, and {5, 3}.
First, by applying Claim, we find that there are 12 contribution groups that satisfy the necessary condition for the nonempty FRP-Core for S: {11, 5, 1}, {11, 3, 1}, {11, 5}, {11, 3}, {11, 1}, {5, 3}, {5, 1}, {3, 1}, {11}, {5}, {3}, and {1}.
The FRP-Core for S = {11, 5, 3} is empty, for example. For S = {11, 5, 3}, we have a * (S) = 19 and V (S) = 180.5. Since 11v(a * (S\{11})) = 88, 5v(a * (S\{5}) = 70, 3v(a * (S\{3})) = 48, and 88 + 70 + 48 > 180.5, the necessary condition for S = {11, 5, 3} to give a FRP-Core allocation is violated. As we see, however, Core F RP ({11, 5, 1}) is not empty. Thus {11, 5, 1}
is the group that achieves the highest level of public good while having a nonempty FRPCore. 21 This analysis provides an interesting observation.
• (Even the largest) group that achieves a FRP-Core allocation may not be consecutive.
22 21 As shown below, group {11, 5, 1} supports some allocations in Core F RP . 22 Although the context and approach are very different, in political science and sociology, the formation of such non-consecutive coalitions is of tremendous interest. The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose Φ(S) is positive (say, S = {11, 5}). Now, we try to find S 0 ⊃ S that still satisfies Φ(S 0 ) ≥ 0. If the value of Φ(S) is positive yet not too large, then adding a player with high θ (say, player 3) may make Φ(S 0 ) < 0, since adding such a player may greatly increase a * (S 0 ), making the free-riding problem severer.
On the contrary, adding a player with low θ (say, player 1) does not make the free-rider problem too severe, so Φ(S 0 ) ≥ 0 may be satisfied relatively easily.
Among the above 12 groups, it is easy to see that groups {5, 1}, {3, 1}, {11}, {5}, {3}, and {1} do not survive the test of Pareto-domination. For example, consider S 0 = {11, 5}
and u 0 = (73, 55, 48, 16) ∈ Core F RP ({11, 5}). This is the best allocation for player 11 in Core F RP ({11, 5}) as the characterization of Core F RP ({11, 5}) in the above indicates. Players other than 11 and 5 are free-riders, and their payoffs are directly generated from a * ({11, 5}) = 16. Now it is straightforward to see that the allocation u 0 dominates all allocations for the above six groups; public good provision levels of those groups are insufficient compared with a * ({11, 5}) = 16.
On the contrary, {5, 3} is not dominated by any FRP-Core allocations for any contribution group. We can show that player 11 can obtain at most 73 in a FRP-Core allocation for any S 3 11, whereas she obtains 88 by free-riding on {5, 3}. Thus, player 11 would not join a deviation. Without player 11's cooperation, no free-riding core allocation that dominates those of {5, 3} can be realized.
Similarly, FRP-Core allocations for S = {11, 1} are dominated by the one for S 0 = {11, 5}.
Under S = {11, 1}, player 5 obtains 60, but S 0 can attain u 0 = (63, 65, 48, 16). Free-ridingproof core allocations for {11, 3, 1} and {11, 3} cannot be beaten, however, by the ones for S 0 = {11, 5}; player 5, for example, gets 70 even under {11, 3} while she would obtain at most 67.5 under S 0 = {11, 5} as we can see from Core F RP ({11, 5}) derived in the above. • An expansion of a group definitely increases the total value of the group, while it gives less flexibility in allocating the benefits among the group members since free-riding incentives increase as the level of the public good provision rises. As a result, some unequal FRP-Core allocations for the original group may not be improved upon by the group expansion.
In summary, the FRP-Core is the union of the following sets of allocations attained by the five different groups. 
It is easy to see that in our example, only player 11 contributes, so the public goods provision level is 11. 23 Thus, by forming a contribution group in the first stage, it is possible to increase the equilibrium level of the public good provision. But it is also possible that the level of public good provision is lower than the Nash equilibrium provision level of the standard voluntary contribution game, as we have found that group {5, 3} achieves some FRP-Core allocations in our example.
• There may be FRP-Core allocations that achieve lower public goods provision levels than the Nash equilibrium outcome of a simple voluntary contribution game studied by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) .
This occurs because in our setup, player 11 can commit to being an outsider in the first stage, which cannot happen in a simultaneous-move voluntary contribution game. Finally, needless to say, we have:
• The FRP-Core may be a highly nonconvex set as different allocations may be realized by different contribution groups.
Replicated Economies
In this section, we analyze whether or not public goods provision and the participation rate decrease as an economy is replicated. There is a tricky issue in replicating a (pure) public goods economy. If the set of consumers is simply replicated, the amount of resources in the economy grows to infinity, while maintaining the same cost function for public good produc-
tion. Following Milleron's (1972) method, Healy (2007) makes each consumer's endowment
shrink proportionally to the population as the economy is replicated to overcome this problem; consumers' preferences are also modified in the replication process. 24 We adopt the same preference modification in the replication of a quasi-linear economy. We shrink each consumer's willingness-to-pay function (and thus utility function) proportionally as the economy is replicated. This way of replication is natural for a quasi-linear economy, since the aggregate willingness-to-pay and cost functions stay the same in the replication process.
The original economy is a list E = (N, (v i ) i∈N , C). Let r = 1, 2, 3, ... be a natural number.
The rth replica of E is a list E r = (N r , (v We analyze FRP-Core allocations (S, a * (S), u * ) of the characteristic function form game V r by focusing on the free-riding-proofness condition. Note that for any r, and for any 24 Conley (1994) uses a different definition of replicated economy, and investigates the convergence of the core.
25 Let x and a denote the consumption level of a private good and the level of a public good, and let º i and º r i be preference relations in the original and rth replica economy, respectively. According to Milleron's (1972) S ⊆ N r , the public good provision level a = a * (S) is determined so that the sum of willingness-to-pay across all members of S equal the marginal cost of public good provision,
i.e.,
C(a * (S)) in order to satisfy the free-riding-proofness, where the terms in the parentheses on the left-hand side indicate how much each player can pay without sacrificing the free-ridingproofness. Let m i (S) ∈ {0, · · · , r} denote the number of type i players in S. Then, the above necessary condition for free-riding-proofness can be rewritten as X
where it should be understood that S \{i q } denote the set of all players but one type i player
Now, consider the kth replication, where k = 1, 2, · · · , of this rth replica of the original economy, which implies that each player in the rth replica of the original economy is divided into k players. Let S k be a coalition in this k × rth replica economy that contains all k replica players of all members of S in rth replica economy. Obviously, a * (S) in rth replica economy equals a * (S k ) in k × rth replica economy. However, although the coefficients satisfy
as k goes to infinity. Thus, the k × rth replica economy's counterpart of inequality (1) would be violated at some point.
Formally, we have the following result. 
Together with Theorem 1, Proposition 4 immediately implies the following theorem. Although this result has some similarity to the main result of Healy (2007), the models and the objectives are very different. Unlike our model, Healy requires that all players (voluntarily) participate in equilibrium, while he does not ask contribution groups to achieve efficient provision of public goods. Thus, the reasons for the convergence are very different in his and our papers. Note also that unlike Theorems 1 and 2, Theorem 3 (and Proposition 4) relies on concavity and convexity of utility and cost functions, respectively, as well as differentiability of them.
Summary
This paper has added players' participation decisions to (pure) public good provision problem. We propose a free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which is a hybrid solution concept based on credibility of coalitional deviations. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public good economy but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET) of a dynamic game with participation decision followed by a common agency game. With a simple example, we have found that the equilibrium contribution group may not be consecutive (with respect to the willingness-to-pay), and the public good may be underprovided than in voluntary contribution game in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Furthermore, public good provision relative to the size of economy goes down to zero, as the participants of the economy are replicated to large numbers.
Appendix A: Preliminary Analysis on the Core of Convex Games
In this appendix, we list a few useful preliminary results on the core of convex games. In our public goods domain, the characteristic-function game generated from a (public goods) economy is convex. Let V : 2 N → R with V (∅) = 0 be a characteristic-function form game.
for all pairs of subsets S and T of N. The core of game V is Core(N, V ) = {u ∈ R N : P i∈N u i = V (N) and Shapley (1971) analyzes the properties of the core of convex games in detail.
One of his results useful for us is the following. (1)}) ,..., and u ω(|N|) = V (N) − V (N\{ω(|N|)}). Then, u = (u i ) i∈N ∈ Core(N, V ), and the set of all such allocations forms the set of vertices of Core(N, V ). Now, we consider a reduced game, in which outsiders always join coalitions and walk away with the payoffs they could obtain by forming their own coalition. Let T be a proper subset
for all S ⊆ T . We have the following result.
Property 2. Suppose that V : N → R is a convex game. Let u N\T = (u i ) i∈N\T be a core allocation of a game V : N\T → R. Then, u T ∈ Core(T,Ṽ T ) if and only if (u T , u N\T ) ∈ Core(N, V ).
Second, we show that u T ∈ Core(T,Ṽ T ) implies (u T , u N\T ) ∈ Core(N, V ). Suppose this is not the case. Then, there is S ⊂ N such that
Since u T ∈ Core(T,Ṽ ) and V is a convex game, we have
Now, we rewrite the core. Let u = (u i ) i∈N be an arbitrary utility vector. Let
That is, sets Q + (u) and Q − (u) denote the collections of coalitions in which players as a whole are satisfied and unsatisfied (in the strict sense) with the utility vector u, respectively. The set
is the collection of coalitions in which players are just indifferent collectively between deviating and not deviating. Obviously, a utility vector u is in the core, i.e., u ∈ Core(N, V ),
Using the above definitions, we now construct an algorithm that starts from an arbitrary utility vector u and terminates with a core allocationû.
Algorithm. Let u ∈ R N and let V : N → R be a convex game. Let u(t) be the utility vector at stage t ∈ R + , and u(0) = u (the initial value). 0) ), then the algorithm terminates immediately. Otherwise, P i∈N u i > V (N) holds, and we reduce each u i for i ∈ N\(∪ S∈Q 0 (u) S) continuously at a common speed as t increases. 26 Since all elements in Q 0 (u) continue to be in Q 0 (u(t)), while some of elements of Q + (u(t)) switch to Q 0 (u(t)) in the process, Q 0 (u(t)) monotonically expands as t increases. Thus, N ∈ Q 0 (u(t)) occurs at some staget. Then we terminate the process. The final outcome isû = u(t).
(b) Suppose Q − (u) 6 = ∅. There are two phases, starting with Phase 1.
i. Phase 1: Start with u(0) = u. For all i ∈ Q − max (u(t)), increase u i continuously at a common speed. Terminate this phase of the algorithm when Q − max (u(t)) = ∅ (or Q − (u(t)) = ∅), and call such t ast. 27 ii. Phase 2: Now, Q − (u(t)) = ∅. Then, we go to the procedure in (a), and we reach
These sets will be shown to be collections of players who gain, remain indifferent, and lose in the above algorithm relative to the initial value u, respectively. By the construction of the algorithm, the following Lemma is straightforward.
26 It follows from the definition of a convex game that ∪ Q∈Q 0 (u) Q = N implies N ∈ Q 0 (u). To prove this claim, it suffices to show that if
We have from the definition of a convex game that
. Together with the above inequality, this implies
. 27 This process guarantees that every player i ∈ Q − max (u(t)) at some stage t ∈ [0,t] must belong to some S 0 ∈ Q 0 (u(t)) at the end of phase 1.
Proof. Note that the payoff for any player in W does not change in phase 2 of case (b) as W ⊆ ∪ S∈Q 0 (u(t)) S. Thus, for all i ∈ W ,û i > u i . Given this, the rest is obvious. ¤ This lemma says that the winners, unaffected players, and losers of the algorithm are identified by sets W , I, and L, respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider the above algorithm. In phase 1 of case (b), Q − max (u(t)) monotonically expands as t increases for t ∈ [0,t). This phase terminates with Q − (u(t)) = ∅. Moreover,
, and W ∈ Q 0 (u(t)).
Proof. As t increases, the payoffs of all members of Q − max (u(t)) increase at the same speed; thus for any S ∈ Q − max (u(t)), η(S, u(t)) decreases at the same speed. Note that for all other
) monotonically expands as t increases. This monotonic utility-raising process continues until Q − (u(t)) = ∅ realizes at
and W ∈ Q 0 (u(t)) (in phase 2 of case (b), payoffs of players in W are not affected). Let
By convexity, it follows that
we have
Starting from any initial value u ∈ R N , this algorithm terminates with a core allocationû ∈ Core(N, V ).
Proof. First, we show that case (a) terminates with a core allocation. To this end, we need only show that ∪ S∈Q 0 (u) S 6 = N whenever P i∈N u i > V (N) (otherwise, the algorithm terminates with an infeasible u). Suppose to the contrary that
Applying the same argument to S 1 ∪ S 2 and S 3 , we
. Repeated application of the same argument generates
This is a contradiction. Thus, in case (a), the algorithm terminates with a feasible allocation. Since u(t) changes continuously,
Now, it follows from Lemma 2 that phase 1 of case (b) terminates with Q − (ũ) = ∅. Thus, the same argument as in case (a) applies to phase 2 of case (b), leading to the conclusion thatû ∈ Core(N, V ) also in case (b). ¤
i for all i ∈ T \S, none in coalition T is strictly better off by this deviation (T, a * (T ), u 0 ). This is a contradiction. Thus, a * (T ) > a * (S) must hold. Now, with the above result, it is easy to prove the rest. Since (T, a
blocks (S, a * (S), u) ∈ Core(S), and a * (T ) > a * (S), it is clear that (T, a * (T ), u 0 ) weakly Pareto-dominates (S, a * (S), u).¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Pick a coalitionS that achieves the highest level of public good provision among the coalitions that support Core F RP . There exists suchS, since the number of coalitions is fi-
. Thus, no allocation in Core F RP (S) is not weakly blocked by any other allocations in
This is a collection of FRP and efficient allocations for S that are immune to nested FRP and efficient deviations. We first claim Core X F RP , S ® = Core F RP (S).
Since for Core F RP (S), coalitional deviations are not required to be FRP, it is obvious that Core X F RP , S ® ⊇ Core F RP (S) holds. To see the opposite direction, we only need to show that FRP condition is not binding for nested deviations. For this, notice that a
holds for all i ∈ T . This implies that all coalitional deviations that blocks (S, a * (S), u) must at least satisfy FRP condition. This
Now, let us consider non-nested coalitional deviations. Pick (S, a 
) for all i ∈ T 0 and T ⊃ T 0 . However, this implies that there ex-
i for all i ∈ T 00 that blocks
there exists T 000 ⊂ T , and (T 000 , a * (T 000 ), u 0000 ) ∈ Core F RP (T 000 ) that blocks (S, a * (S), u). This proves that whenever (S, a * (S), u) is blocked by nonnested T via (T, a
it is also blocked by some T 000 ⊂ T via (T 000 , a * (T 000 ), u 0000 ) ∈ Core F RP (T 000 ). This completes the proof of Core
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we construct a strategy profile σ, which will be shown to support (S * , a
where u * ∈ Core F RP (S * ), as a PCPNE. In defining σ, we assign a CPNE utility profile to every subgame S 0 . Then, we show by way of contradiction that there is no credible and profitable deviation from σ.
A strategy profile in the second stage σ 2 is generated from utility allocations assigned in each subgame (we utilize truthful strategies that support utility outcomes). We partition the set of subgames S = {S 0 ∈ 2 N : S 0 6 = ∅} into three categories: S 1 = {S * } on the equilibrium path, S 2 = {S 0 ∈ S : S 0 ∩ S * = ∅}, and S 3 = {S 0 ∈ S\S 1 : S 0 ∩ S * 6 = ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S 0 corresponds to a core allocation for S 0 . In order to support the equilibrium path (S * , a * (S * ), u * ), we need to show that there is no credible deviation in the first stage. Since a credible deviation requires both free-ridingproofness and profitability, utility levelū i = max{u * i , v i (S 0 \{i})} plays an important role as to whether or not player i joins a coalitional deviation.
We construct a core allocation for subgame S 0 with the algorithm described in the Appendix A, starting with the initial valueū. Then we show that if there exists a credible deviation by coalition T , which induces (S 0 , a
. This is a contradiction to the presumption that (S * , a
Thus, we will conclude that there is no credible deviation from (S * , a * (S * ), u * ).
The construction of the core allocation for each subgame is as follows.
1. We assign (S * , a * (S * ), u * ) ∈ Core F RP to the on-equilibrium subgame S * .
2. For any S 0 with S 0 ∩ S * = ∅, we assign an extreme point of the core for S 0 of a convex game. For an arbitrarily selected order ω over S 0 , we assign payoff vector
, and so on, following Shapley (1971) . Call this allocationû S 0 ∈ Core(S 0 , V ) (see Property 1 in the Appendix A).
3. For any S 0 with S 0 ∩ S * 6 = ∅, we assign a core allocation in the following manner. It requires a few steps. First, we deal with the outsiders S 0 \ S * . Let ω :
{1, · · · , |S 0 \S * |} → S 0 \S * be an arbitrary bijection, and letû
Such a core allocation minimizes the total payoffs for S 0 \S * (Shapley, 1971 ). The
Consider a reduced game of (S 0 , V ) on S 0 ∩ S * with u S 0 \S * as given above andṼ S 0 ∩S * : 2
. By Property 2, we know
By the algorithm in Appendix A, we construct a core allocationû S 0 ∩S * from vectorū S 0 ∩S * = (ū i ) i∈S 0 ∩S * for the reduced gamẽ
We support these core allocations by truthful strategies. Let σ 1 i = 1 for i ∈ S * , and σ
i for all i ∈ S * , and let σ 2 i [S 0 ] be a truthful strategy relative to a * (S 0 ) with
Since a core allocation with truthful strategies is assigned to every subgame, it is a CPNE. If there is a deviation from σ, therefore, it must happen in the first stage.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists a coalition T that profitably and credibly deviates from the equilibrium σ. Note that in the reduced game played by T , it must be a PCPNE deviation with σ 0 T for given σ −T . In the original equilibrium, S * is the contribution group. This implies that every i ∈ (N\S * )\T plays σ (i) the members of S * \S 0 ⊂ T that switch to free-riding after the deviation,
(ii) the members of S 0 \S * ⊂ T that join the contribution group upon deviation, (iii) the members of (S * ∩ S 0 )\T ⊂ S 0 that still participate in the contribution group after the deviation, with the same prescribed menu in the second stage, (iv) the members of (S * ∩ S 0 ) ∩ T ⊂ S 0 that change their strategies in the second stage, (v) the members of N \(S 0 ∪ S * ) that are outsiders both before and after the deviation.
Let the resulting allocation be (S 0 , a * (S 0 ), u 0 ). Since the deviation is profitable and credible, the members of T , i.e., those who are categorized in (i), (ii), and (iv) are better off after the deviation. That is,
Given our supposition, the following claims must be true.
First we claim that members of (ii) exist and that a * (S 0 ) > a * (S * ) as they are better off after the deviation. The set of players in (ii) is nonempty, since otherwise S 0 ⊂ S * and a coalitional deviation by T cannot be profitable as (S * , a * (S * ), u * ) is a core allocation. This result is from Proposition 1.
Since all players use truthful strategies in the strategy profile σ even after T 's deviation, the members in (iii) (outsiders of T ) obtain the same payoff vectorû (S * ∩S 0 )\T (S 0 ) as in the original subgame CPNE for S 0 . It is because in subgame S 0 (even after deviation), a * (S 0 ) must be provided as a CPNE (core) must be assigned to the subgame. Thus, we have the following for group (iii).
Claim 2. After the deviation by T , every
Since u 0 needs to be a CPNE payoff vector in the second stage of the reduced game by
on the other hand, we have P i∈S 0 \S * ûi = V (S 0 \S * ). Thus, we have the following for group
(ii).
Claim 3.
The next claim shows that the counterpart of Claim 3 holds for group (iv).
Proof of Claim 4. Group (iv) consists of members of W , I, and L. Note that u 0 i ≥ū i for any i ∈ S 0 ∩ S * ∩ T since otherwise they would have no incentive to join the deviation.
First consider the set W of winners in group (iv); we haveû i ≥ū i by the definition of W . The contribution group S 0 must be immune to a coalitional deviation by W , so we have 
Together with P i∈W u 0 i ≥ P i∈Wû i and P i∈I u 0 i ≥ P i∈Iû i , these implies that L is empty, and hence P i∈S 0 ∩S * ∩T u 0 i ≥ P i∈S 0 ∩S * ∩Tû i . Consequently, we have from (3) that P i∈S 0 ∩S * ∩T u 0 i = P i∈S 0 ∩S * ∩Tû i . ¤ Claims 2, 3, and 4 immediately imply the following for group (ii).
Claim 5.
The final claim follows from Claim 5 and the supposition that the deviation by T is profitable and credible. for all i ∈ S * , we first note that since u * ∈ Core(S * ) and the game V is convex, we have u * i ≤ V (S * ) − V (S * \{i}) (Shapley 1971 ). Now,
where the last inequality holds since P j∈S * \{i} v j (a) − C(a) is maximized at a = a * (S * \{i}).
This proves that all members of groups (i), (iii), and (iv) are better off in the allocation 
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose to the contrary that for all natural number n, there exists r ≥ n such that (S r , a * (S r ), u * r ) ∈ Core F RP (V r ) and a * (S r ) ≥ā. This implies that there exists an increasing sequence of natural numbers r that satisfy (S r , a * (S r ), u * r ) ∈ Core F RP (V r ). We show that (under this supposition) for any r with (S r , a * (S r ), u * r ) ∈ Core F RP (V r ) and any i q ∈ S r , a * (S r \ {i q }) approaches a * (S r ) as r → ∞, and hence the left-hand side of
diminishes to zero (since v Now, a * (S r ), the public good provision level induced by the contribution group S r , is chosen so as to satisfy the first-order condition:
where [m j (S r )/r]v 0 j (a) = P i q ∈S v r0 i q (a). For any r, the left-hand side of (4) is continuous and strictly decreasing in the public good provision level a since v 00 j ≤ 0 and C 00 > 0 (as Figure 2 illustrates). Similarly, for any i q ∈ S r , the optimality of public good provision requires that a * (S r \ {i q }) satisfy 
or equivalently Since C(a * (S)) > C(ā) > 0, we have shown that there existsr(ā) such that for any r ≥r(ā), the free-riding-proofness condition (1) fails to be satisfied, which implies that a * (S * ) <ā for any (S * , a * (S * ), u * ) ∈ Core F RP (V r ) when r ≥r(ā). 
